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Article 
The Future of Securitization 
STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ  
Securitization, a process in which firms can raise low-cost financing 
by efficiently allocating asset risks with investor appetite for risk, has been 
one of the most dominant and fastest-growing means of capital formation 
in the United States and the world.  The subprime financial crisis, 
however, has revealed certain defects with how securitization is sometimes 
utilized.  This Article examines these defects and the extent they can, and 
should, be remedied going forward. 
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The Future of Securitization 
STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ∗  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
This Article examines the future viability of securitization in light of 
its involvement in the subprime-mortgage financial crisis (“subprime 
crisis”).1  The Article concludes that securitization should, and indeed 
likely will, have a viable if not vibrant future.  There are many reasons for 
this.  Securitization efficiently allocates risk with capital.  It enables 
companies to access capital markets directly, in most cases at lower cost 
than the cost of issuing direct debt (such as bonds or commercial paper), 
and it avoids middleman inefficiencies.  Moreover, when the securitized 
assets are loans, securitization helps to transform the loans into cash from 
which banks and other lenders can make new loans.2 
These positives might be outweighed, however, by securitization’s 
negatives revealed by the subprime crisis.  There are four such potential 
negatives: subprime mortgages may be a flawed asset type that should not 
have been securitized; the originate-to-distribute model of securitization 
might create moral hazard; securitization can create servicing conflicts; and 
securitization can foster overreliance on mathematical models.  This 
Article examines these negatives and the extent to which they can be 
                                                                                                                          
∗ Stanley A. Star Professor of Law & Business, Duke University School of Law; Founding/Co-
Academic Director, Duke Global Capital Markets Center.  E-mail: schwarcz@law.duke.edu.  The 
Author thanks participants in the University of Connecticut, Law Review Symposium, “The Subprime 
Crisis: Going Forward,” as well as Thomas Burns, Anupam Chander, Edward Janger, Jason Kravitt, 
and Thomas Plank, for helpful comments on this symposium article. 
1 Securitization refers to the process of turning financial assets into securities issued by a special 
purpose vehicle.  Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 
133, 135 (1994). 
2 See STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE, A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ASSET 
SECURITIZATION §1:1, §§11:1–11:2 (3d ed. & supps. 2008); Steven L. Schwarcz, Securitization Post-
Enron, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1539, 1565 (2004) (concluding why securitization should “create[] net 
value [even] for unsecured creditors”); Charles W. Calomiris & Joseph Mason, Credit Card 
Securitization and Regulatory Arbitrage 4 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Pa., Working Paper No. 03-7, 2003), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=569862 (finding that the empirical 
evidence for credit card securitization “is more consistent with the efficient contracting view . . . of 
securitization”); see also JASON KRAVITT, FOREWORD: SOME THOUGHTS ON WHAT HAS HAPPENED TO 
THE CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURITIZATION AND WHERE SECURITIZATION IS GOING 3–4 (2008), 
available at http://www.pli.edu/public/17984/foreword.pdf (arguing that “securitized products, when 
structured properly and used wisely, have the potential to be one of the most valuable financial 
innovations of the modern financial era”); Martin Hellwig, Systemic Risk in the Financial Sector: An 
Analysis of the Subprime-Mortgage Financial Crisis 7 (Nov. 2008 preprint of the Max Planck Institute 
for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn, No. 2008/43), available at www.ssrn.com/abstract=1309442 
(explaining why “the securitization of [residential real estate] risks should be regarded as a good idea”). 
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remedied in the future. 
The subprime crisis also revealed a possible fifth negative: investors in 
securitization transactions—essentially pension funds, mutual funds, hedge 
funds, banks, insurance companies, and other institutional investors3—may 
over-rely on rating-agency ratings.4       
To follow the analysis below, the reader should note the following 
terminology.  Subprime mortgage securitization, the type of securitization 
whose failure initially triggered the chain of failures that became the 
subprime crisis,5 is a subset of mortgage securitization.  In the most basic 
form of mortgage securitization, mortgage-backed securities (MBS) are 
issued by a special-purpose vehicle (SPV),6 and payment on the securities 
is derived directly from collections on mortgage loans owned by the SPV.  
More complex forms of mortgage-backed securities include collateralized 
debt obligation (CDO) securities in which payment derives directly from a 
mixed pool of mortgage loans and sometimes, also, from other financial 
assets owned by the SPV; and “ABS CDO” securities in which payment 
derives from MBS and CDO securities owned by the SPV (and thus 
indirectly from the mortgage loans and other financial assets underlying 
those owned securities).7  Subprime mortgage securitization can mean any 
of these types of mortgage securitization where all or a portion of the 
underlying financial assets consists of subprime mortgage loans.8 
Prior to the subprime crisis, most MBS, CDO, and ABS securities 
were highly rated by rating agencies.9 
II.  WHAT WENT WRONG, AND WHAT NEEDS TO BE FIXED? 
This Article identifies certain potential negatives of securitization 
revealed by the subprime crisis and examines the extent to which these 
negatives can be remedied in the future. 
                                                                                                                          
3 GREENWICH ASSOCIATES, SURVEY OF SECURITIZATION MARKET INVESTORS 2 (2005). 
4 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating Agency Paradox, 
2002 U. ILLINOIS L. REV. 1, 2–5, 8 (2002) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Markets] 
(providing an introduction to ratings, rating agencies, and the ratings process).  For an analysis of the 
integrity of the ratings process and of the extent that investors should appropriately rely on ratings, see 
Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons from the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown, 
93 MINN. L. REV. 373, 380–82 (2008) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets].  The 
extent of appropriate reliance on ratings, and indeed the integrity of the ratings process itself, are 
questions beyond this Article’s scope. 
5 For an examination of how a market failure can trigger a chain of failures resulting in a financial 
crisis, see Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 194–200 (2008) (providing several 
examples of individual market failures causing a domino effect across several markets or industries).  
6 An SPV is sometimes called a special-purpose entity, or “SPE.”  Schwarcz, Protecting 
Financial Markets, supra note 4, at 376. 
7 Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets, supra note 4, at 376–77. 
8 See infra note 10 and accompanying text. 
9 Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets, supra note 4, at 106.   
 2009] THE FUTURE OF SECURITIZATION 1317 
A.  Flawed Asset Type 
Subprime mortgage securitization failed, initially triggering the chain 
of failures that became the subprime crisis, because of the particular and 
almost unique nature of the underlying subprime mortgage loans.  These 
are high-interest-rate home mortgage loans made to risky borrowers.10  
Many of these borrowers relied on refinancing their appreciating home 
values to repay their loans.11  This model was successful as long as home 
prices appreciated,12 as they had been doing for decades.13  
However, when home prices stopped appreciating and began 
collapsing, those borrowers were unable to refinance.  Furthermore, many 
subprime mortgage loans had adjustable rates which increased after an 
initial “teaser” period.14  Borrowers who could not afford the rate increases 
had expected to refinance at lower interest rates.15  That likewise was 
stymied by collapsing home prices.  As a result, many risky borrowers 
began defaulting, causing some of the highly rated MBS, CDO, and ABS 
CDO securities—whose payment depended on collections from the 
underlying financial assets16—to default or to have their credit ratings 
downgraded.17  These defaults and downgrades, in turn, caused investors in 
rated securities to begin losing confidence in the financial markets.18 
The failure of subprime mortgage securitization was thus caused by its 
almost absolute dependence on home appreciation.  Some believe this 
sensitivity to the decline in housing prices was unique.19  From that 
perspective, parties structuring securitization transactions can minimize 
future problems by excluding, or at least limiting and better managing, 
                                                                                                                          
10 Although subprime mortgage loans were sometimes made to affluent borrowers in amounts that 
may be difficult for such borrowers to repay, a significant amount of subprime mortgage loans were 
made to non-affluent or poor borrowers.  To some extent this followed the U.S. Government’s strong 
encouragement of lenders to make mortgage loans to low-income, often disproportionately minority, 
borrowers; to some extent it also may have reflected greed due to the high interest rates charged to 
risky borrowers.  Steven L. Schwarcz, Understanding the ‘Subprime’ Financial Crisis, 60 S.C. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2009).  
11 Id.  
12 This model’s viability also relied on interest rates not rising so high as to make refinancing 
uneconomic.  Although the subprime crisis was not caused by rising interest rates, the model’s 
additional susceptibility to rate risk buttresses the view that any securitization of subprime mortgage 
loans should be limited and better managed.  See infra notes 19–20 and accompanying text (discussing 
the management of risks caused by subprime mortgages). 
13 Schwarcz, supra note 10, at 2. 
14 Id. 
15 Id.  
16 See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text (introducing different types of mortgage-backed 
securities). 
17 Schwarcz, supra note 10.  The CDO and especially ABS CDO securities were particularly hard 
hit because of their highly magnified leverage.  Id.  
18 Schwarcz, supra note 10. 
19 Gary B. Gorton, The Panic of 2007 67 (Yale ICF, Working Paper No. 08-24, 2008), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1255362.  
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subprime mortgage loans as an eligible type of underlying financial asset,20 
and also by conservatively assessing the payment prognosis for other types 
of financial assets underlying securitizations.21  This is important not only 
to protect the integrity of securitization transactions but also to avoid the 
unintended consequence that securitization of a flawed asset type can 
motivate greater origination of that asset type, effectively magnifying the 
flaw.  
This is not to say these procedures will be failsafe.  Parties to, and 
investors in, securitization transactions must always be diligent to 
recognize and try to protect against the possibility that the underlying 
financial assets might, as in the case of subprime mortgage loans, fail in 
unexpected ways.  What would happen to automobile loan securitizations, 
for example, if a technological innovation makes cars obsolete, depriving 
even financially healthy borrowers of the incentive to repay their loans?22  
The invention of a new form of personal transportation is at least as 
plausible as the idea that home prices—which generally had only risen 
since the 1930s—would suddenly collapse in value at a rate higher than 
that seen during the Great Depression, as happened in the subprime crisis.23 
The subprime crisis also teaches us the danger of mixing politics and 
finance.  Before the crisis, there was political pressure to securitize risky 
subprime mortgage loans to facilitate financing for the poor.24  We might 
see the same type of future political pressure, for example, to securitize 
risky microfinance loans to facilitate financing for the poor and 
disadvantaged. 
B.  Originate-to-Distribute Moral Hazard  
Some argue that securitization facilitated an undisciplined mortgage 
lending industry.25  By enabling mortgage lenders to sell off loans as they 
                                                                                                                          
20 Any such managing should also take into account rate risk.   
21 Assessments of payment prognosis should, bottom line, strive to be as accurate as possible.  
But where a prognosis has a margin of error, perhaps one should err, in structuring transactions, on the 
more conservative side of that margin.    
22 I am not suggesting that auto loans might be a flawed asset type but merely illustrating how 
underlying financial assets could fail in unexpected ways.  Even if financially healthy borrowers lost 
their incentive to repay auto loans, they could be sued for payment and—unlike subprime mortgage 
borrowers—would have the means to pay.  Such lawsuits, though, would generate relatively high 
transaction costs which, if not recoupable from the collateral or the borrowers, would reduce funds 
available to pay the securitized notes. 
23 Compare, for example, the fear around turn of the century New York City, before the invention 
of the automobile, that horse manure would create a public health hazard.  See JOHN DUFFY, A 
HISTORY OF PUBLIC HEALTH IN NEW YORK CITY 1866–1966, at 126–27 (1974); Clay McShane & Joel 
A. Tarr, The Centrality of the Horse in the Nineteenth-Century American City, in THE MAKING OF 
URBAN AMERICA 105, 120–21 (Raymond A. Mohl, ed., 2d ed. 1997). 
24 See supra note 10. 
25 See, e.g., Martin Feldstein, How to Stop the Mortgage Crisis, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 2008, at 
A15, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File (describing lax lending standards that gave rise 
to mortgages with loan-to-value ratios of nearly 100% and citing the 1.8 million mortgages then in 
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were made (a concept called “originate-to-distribute” or “originate-and-
distribute”), securitization is said to have created moral hazard since these 
lenders did not have to live with the credit consequences of their loans.26  
Mortgage underwriting standards therefore fell, exacerbated by the fact 
that mortgage lenders could make money on the volume of loans 
originated.27 
I find the moral hazard argument weak.  Mortgage underwriting 
standards may have fallen, but there are other explanations.  For example, 
lower standards may well reflect distortions caused by the liquidity glut of 
that time, in which lenders competed aggressively for business and allowed 
otherwise defaulting home borrowers to refinance.28  They also may reflect 
conflicts of interest between firms and their employees in charge of setting 
those standards, such as where employees were paid for booking loans 
regardless of the loans’ long-term performance.29  Blaming the originate-
to-distribute model for lower mortgage underwriting standards also does 
not explain why standards were not similarly lowered for originating non-
                                                                                                                          
default); David Henry & Matthew Goldstein, The Bear Flu: How it Spread, BUS. WK., Dec. 31, 2007, 
at 30, available at LEXIS, News Library, BUSWK File (arguing that the distance between mortgage-
loan originators and the ultimate holders of the loans encouraged lax lending); cf. John C. Dugan, 
Speech Given at The Annual Convention of The American Bankers Association, Oct. 8, 2007, at 5, 
available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2007-109a.pdf (observing that with the increasing use 
of the originate-to-distribute model of lending, lending standards shifted from evaluating the likelihood 
of repayment to evaluating the likelihood that the loan could be sold).  But cf. Gorton, supra note 19, at 
67–68 (disagreeing with this explanation, although observing that the originate-to-distribute model and 
resulting moral hazard are the “dominant explanation” for the financial panic); Effi Benmelech, 
Jennifer Dlugosz, & Victoria Ivashina, What Lies Beneath: A Look Inside CLO Collateral 2, available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1344068 (finding, empirically, that bank loans that are securitized 
perform no worse than bank loans that are held). 
26 Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets, supra note 4, at 387–88. 
27 See, e.g., Legislative and Regulatory Options for Minimizing and Mitigating Mortgage 
Foreclosures: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Financial Serv., 110th Cong. 74 (2007), available at 
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_house_hearings&docid=f:39540.pdf 
(statement of Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve System) (“When an originator sells a mortgage 
. . . much or all of the risks are passed on to the loan purchaser.  Thus, originators who sell loans may 
have less incentive to undertake careful underwriting . . . .”).  There is also speculation that some 
mortgage-loan originators might have engaged in fraud by manipulating borrower income, and that 
some borrowers may have engaged in fraud by lying about their income, in each case to qualify 
borrowers for loans.  See, e.g., Vikas Bajaj, A Cross-Country Blame Game, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2007, 
at C1, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File (noting the recent practice of mortgage companies 
giving out loans based on limited documentation).  If such fraud occurred, it would exacerbate but is 
unlikely to be significant enough to have caused the subprime financial crisis. 
28 See Ravi Balakrishnan et al., Globalization, Gluts, Innovation or Irrationality: What Explains 
the Easy Financing of the U.S. Current Account Deficit? 5 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 
07/160, 2007), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/wp07160.pdf (discussing the 
liquidity and savings glut).  
29 See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Conflicts and Financial Collapse: The Problem of Secondary-
Management Agency Costs (work-in-progress, on file with the Connecticut Law Review);  Steven L. 
Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH. U. L. REV., Issue 2 (forthcoming 
2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1240863 [hereinafter Schwarcz, Regulating 
Complexity] (arguing that conflicts of interest independent of the originate-to-distribute model, 
involving ordinary agency costs, as well as a combination of herd mentality and complacency, can 
explain the lowered investing standards). 
 1320 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1313 
mortgage financial assets used in other types of securitization 
transactions.30  Nor does it explain why the ultimate owners of the 
mortgage loans—the investors in the mortgage-backed securities—did not 
govern their investments by the same strict lending standards that they 
would observe but for the separation of origination and ownership.31 
Although I do not believe the originate-to-distribute model was a 
material cause of the subprime crisis,32 the model may need fixing to avoid 
its perception as the cause.  There is little question, though, that the model 
should remain largely intact.  It is critical to the underlying funding 
liquidity of banks and corporations.33  Furthermore, scholars have at least 
tentatively concluded that, despite the subprime crisis, it has created value 
in the financial markets.34  The goal therefore should be to minimize any 
potential moral hazard resulting from the originate-to-distribute model 
without undermining the model’s basic utility.   
There are various ways this could be done.  Potential moral hazard 
problems could be managed, for example, by requiring mortgage lenders 
and other originators to retain some realistic risk of loss.35   
                                                                                                                          
30 Gorton, supra note 19, at 73–74. 
31 See generally William P. Alexander, et al., Some Loans are More Equal than Others: Third-
Party Originations and Defaults in the Subprime Mortgage Industry (2001), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=281233 (finding that although agency problems 
between lenders and third-party originators of subprime mortgage loans appear to make certain third-
party-originated loans more likely to default, that higher default rate becomes recognized and priced in 
the loan interest rate).  
32 Jason Kravitt likewise believes that the originate-to-distribute model was not a material cause 
of the subprime crisis.  KRAVITT, supra note 2, at 22.  He argues that the parties involved in subprime 
mortgage securitization transactions suffered serious losses and ruined reputations, and hence there was 
no moral hazard.  That does not obviate the possibility, though, that moral hazard motivated those 
parties to act as they did.  Moral hazard must be judged ex ante, not ex post.  
33 See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons from the Subprime 
Mortgage Meltdown, 93 MINN. L. REV. 373, 388 n.74 (citing Joseph R. Mason, Assoc. Professor of 
Fin. & LeBow Research Fellow, Lebow Coll. of Bus., Drexel Univ., Presentation to the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Cleveland: Mortgage Loan Modification: Promises and Pitfalls (Nov. 20, 2007)) 
(presentation notes on file with author) (showing that fifty-eight percent of mortgage liquidity in the 
United States, and seventy-five percent of mortgage liquidity in California has come from structured 
finance). 
34 See Xudong An et al., Value Creation Through Securitization: Evidence from the CMBS 
Market 3 (SSRN Working Paper No. 1095645, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=1095645 (“Despite recent constraints on secondary market funding and liquidity, 
securitization appears to have created value in financial markets.”). 
35 Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets, supra note 4, at 116; cf. Jan Pieter Krahnen & 
Guenter Franke, The Future of Securitization (SSRN, Working Paper No. 1284989, 2008), available at 
http://www.ifk-cfs.de/fileadmin/downloads/publications/wp/08_31.pdf (arguing for the importance of 
equity piece retention).  Requiring originators to retain a risk of loss, however, is a two-edged sword 
because it also can create a “mutual misinformation” problem.  See Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity, 
supra note 29, at 16−18 (observing that many underwriters of ABS CDO and other complex mortgage-
backed securities did not fully understand the risks associated with their retained tranches, thereby 
signaling unjustified confidence in the securities being sold).  Professor Mason also has argued that 
originator risk retention can create “cliff risk.”  Joseph R. Mason, Cliff Risk and the Credit Crisis 12–
14 (SSRN, Working Paper No. 1296250, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1296250. 
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In many non-mortgage securitization transactions, for 
example, it is customary for originators to bear a direct risk 
of loss by overcollateralizing the receivables sold to the 
SPV.36  This was not always done in mortgage securitization 
because mortgage loans traditionally are overcollateralized 
by the value of the borrower’s equity in the real-estate 
collateral,37 and thus investors can effectively be 
overcollateralized even if the originator bears no separate risk 
of loss.38  
Moral hazard problems also could be managed by regulating the loan 
underwriting standards applicable to mortgage lenders.  The U.S. 
government took this type of approach, for example, in response to the 
margin loan underwriting failures that helped trigger the Great Depression.  
When stock values began depreciating in 1929, margin loans (that is, loans 
to purchase publicly-listed stock) became undercollateralized, resulting in 
a high loan default rate which, in turn, caused bank lenders to fail.39  To 
protect against a recurrence of this problem, the Federal Reserve 
promulgated margin regulations G, U, T, and X, requiring margin lenders 
to maintain two-to-one collateral coverage when securing their loans by 
margin stock that has been purchased, directly or indirectly, with the loan 
proceeds.40  
A similar type of approach, such as imposing a minimum real-estate-
value-to-loan collateral coverage ratio on all mortgage loans secured by the 
real estate financed, would protect against a repeat of the subprime crisis. 
This protection would come at a high price, however, potentially impeding 
and increasing the cost of home ownership and imposing an administrative 
burden on lenders and government monitors.41  Nor would it protect 
against different types of financial crises that might arise in the future.42  
Any regulatory approach, to be viable, should have to demonstrate that its 
benefits are at least likely to exceed its costs.43 
                                                                                                                          
36 Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets, supra note 4, at 116. 
37 In subprime mortgage securitizations, though, borrowers are not always required to put in 
equity.  Investors therefore would have had greater justification in asking originators to bear a direct 
risk of loss by overcollateralizing subprime mortgage loans sold to SPVs. 
38 Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets, supra note 4, at 116.  For an analysis of why 
investors and other parties, such as credit insurers, who, as a result of the originate-to-distribute model, 
ultimately bore the risk of loss in subprime mortgage securitizations did not adequately monitor the 
underlying mortgage loans, see Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets, supra note 4, at 117; 
Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity, supra note 29, at 16. 
39 Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets, supra note 4, at 107−08. 
40 12 C.F.R. § 221.3 (2008). 
41 Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets, supra note 4, at 118 (examining this approach as well 
as other types of mortgage loan suitability standards). 
42 Id. at 111. 
43 Schwarcz, supra note 5, at 234–35. 
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C.  Servicing Conflicts 
There is general agreement that mortgage securitization has made it 
difficult to work out problems with the underlying mortgage loans because 
the beneficial owners of the loans are no longer the mortgage lenders but a 
broad universe of financial-market investors in the MBS and other 
securities.  Although servicers theoretically bridge the gap between 
investors (as beneficial owners of the loans) and the mortgage lenders, 
retaining the power to restructure the underlying loans “in the best 
interests” of those investors, the reality is problematic.  
Servicers may be reluctant to engage in restructuring if there is 
uncertainty that their transactions will generate sufficient excess cash flow 
to reimburse their costs, whereas all foreclosure costs are reimbursed.44  
Servicers also may sometimes prefer foreclosure over restructuring 
because the former is more ministerial and thus has a lower litigation risk.  
In many CDO and ABS CDO mortgage securitization transactions, cash 
flows deriving from principal and interest are separately allocated to 
different investor tranches.45  Therefore, a restructuring that, for example, 
reduces the interest rate, would adversely affect investors in the interest-
only tranche, leading to what some have called “tranche warfare.”46 
These problems—which currently are mostly confined to mortgage 
securitization47—can, and in the future should, be fixed.  Parties should 
write underlying deal documentation that sets clearer and more flexible 
guidelines and more certain reimbursement procedures for loan 
restructuring, especially when restructuring appears to be superior to 
foreclosure.48  They also should try to minimize allocating cash flows to 
investors in ways that create conflicts.49  And consideration should be 
given to protecting servicers, whether contractually or through legislation, 
from liability for taking actions in good faith, akin to the business 
                                                                                                                          
44 Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets, supra note 4, at 121. 
45 The classes, or “tranches,” of securities issued in securitization transactions are “typically 
ranked by seniority of payment priority.”  Id. at 105. 
46 Id. at 121. 
47 Id. at 116. 
48 In the subprime crisis, the underlying deal documentation is already in place and cannot be 
easily renegotiated.  The government therefore might consider legislating changes, recognizing that any 
such changes that are subsidized in whole or part by government could foster moral hazard, potentially 
making future homeowners more willing to take risks when borrowing.  Another approach, with less 
potential for moral hazard, is for government to legislatively insulate servicers from liability for taking 
actions in good faith, akin to the business judgment rule applied to performance of corporate directors.  
Cf. Steven L. Schwarcz & Gregory Sergi, Bond Defaults and the Dilemma of the Indenture Trustee, 59 
ALA. L. REV. 1037, 1040–41 (2008) (explaining why indenture trustees on public bonds, presently 
obligated to act under a “prudent man” standard, should be protected by this rule).  With this 
protection, servicers are more likely to engage in restructuring if, in their judgment, they believe that 
restructuring is likely to maximize overall value. 
49 Cf. AMERICAN SECURITIZATION FORUM ET AL., RESTORING CONFIDENCE IN THE 
SECURITIZATION MARKETS 7 (2008) [hereinafter RESTORING CONFIDENCE] (recommending 
harmonizing and improving securitization servicing standards). 
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judgment rule applied to performance of corporate directors.50  With this 
protection, servicers would be more likely to engage in restructuring if, in 
their judgment, they believe that restructuring is likely to maximize overall 
value.    
D.  Overreliance on Mathematical Models   
To some extent the subprime crisis resulted from an abandonment of 
common sense and an overreliance on complex mathematical models.51  
Models are essential to securitization because of the need to statistically 
predict what future cash flows will become available from the underlying 
financial assets to pay the securities issued by the SPV.52   
Models can bring insight and clarity.  If the model is realistic and the 
inputted data are reliable, models can yield accurate predictions of real 
events.  However, if the model is unrealistic or the inputted data are 
unreliable, models can be misleading—creating the danger of “garbage in, 
garbage out.”53 
Subprime mortgage securitization models relied on assumptions and 
historical data which, in retrospect, turned out to be incorrect and therefore 
made the valuations incorrect.54  The models incorrectly assumed, for 
example, that housing would not depreciate in value to the levels presently 
seen.55  Valuation errors were further compounded to the extent subprime 
mortgage loans increasingly were made with innovative terms, such as 
adjustable rates, low-to-zero down payment requirements, interest-only 
payment options, and negative amortization.56  These terms were so 
                                                                                                                          
50 See supra note 48. 
51 Cf. Karl S. Okamoto, After the Bailout: Regulating Systemic Moral Hazard 23 (SSRN, 
Working Paper No. 2009-W-01, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=1292476 (observing that underlying the subprime financial crisis “was an enormous faith in the 
market’s ability to analyze and measure risk”).  Some of the overreliance may reflect that the 
complexity of the mortgage-backed securities made it difficult for investors to fully appreciate the risks 
they were incurring, tempting them to rely on such imperfect substitutes as rating-agency ratings and 
the results of mathematical models.  Cf. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity, supra note 29, at 32–40 
(discussing why disclosure failed in the subprime crisis and the consequences of such failure). 
52 Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity, supra note 29, at 16–17 (discussing how statistical models 
utilized by monolines did not adequately test for the scenario of rapidly falling house prices, which led 
to many mono lines losing their AAA ratings). 
53 Cf. Emanuel Derman & Paul Wilmott, Perfect Models, Imperfect World, BUS. WK., Jan. 12, 
2009, at 59, available at LEXIS, News Library, BUSWK File (discussing cash-flow modeling and 
concluding that, “[a]t bottom, financial models are tools for approximate thinking, a way to help 
transform one’s intuition about the future into a” useable number). 
54 Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets, supra note 4, at 398; see also Eugene Ludwig, 
Founder and CEO, Promontory Fin. Group, 10th William Taylor Memorial Lecture at the International 
Conference of Banking Supervisors 3 (Sept. 25, 2008) (stating that “it is widely accepted” now that the 
subprime mortgage securitization models used by rating agencies and other market participants relied 
on “insufficient data and faulty assumptions”). 
55 See supra notes 13–17 and accompanying text. 
56 EDWARD VINCENT MURPHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ALTERNATIVE MORTGAGES: RISKS TO 
CONSUMERS AND LENDERS IN THE CURRENT HOUSING CYCLE 2 (2006), available at 
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complex that some borrowers did not fully understand the risks they were 
incurring.57  As a result, they defaulted at a much higher rate than would be 
predicted by the historical mortgage-loan default rates relied on by loan 
originators in extending credit.58 
Securitization models also have been used, sometimes erroneously, to 
substitute for real market information.  For example, some CDO and ABS 
CDO securities did not have an active trading market, so investors instead 
relied on mark-to-model valuation of these securities.  When assumptions 
underlying the models turned out to be wrong,59 investors panicked 
because they did not know what the securities were worth.60 
In theory, this overreliance on mathematical models is self-correcting 
because the subprime crisis, by its existence, has shaken faith in the 
market’s ability to analyze and measure risk through models.61  
Securitization products are likely to be confined, at least in the near future, 
to those that can be robustly modeled.  The only question will be the 
longevity of the lesson that future risks cannot always be predicted through 
mathematical models.62 
III.  CONCLUSIONS 
Because securitization, properly utilized, is an efficient financial tool,63 its 
future should be assured no matter how investors or politicians might temporarily 
overreact.  Nor should they overreact.  As Professor Gorton observes,  
                                                                                                                          
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33775_20061227.pdf. 
57 PATRICIA A. MCCOY & ELIZABETH RENUART, JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES, HARVARD 
UNIV., THE LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURE OF SUBPRIME AND NONTRADITIONAL HOME MORTGAGES 17 
(2008), available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/finance/understanding_consumer_credit/ 
papers/ucc08-5_mccoy_renuart.pdf. 
58 Subprime Mortgage Market Turmoil: Examining the Role of Securitization: Hearing Before the 
S. Subcomm. on Securities, Insurance and Investments, 110th Cong. 3–4 (2007) (statement of Kurt 
Eggert, Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law), available at http://banking.senate. 
gov/public/_files/eggert.pdf; EDWARD GOLDING, RICHARD K. GREEN, & DOUGLAS A. MCMANUS, 
JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES, HARVARD UNIV., IMPERFECT INFORMATION AND THE HOUSING 
FINANCE CRISIS 14 (2008), available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/finance/ 
understanding_consumer_credit/papers/ucc08-6_golding_green_mcmanus.pdf. 
59 Some of these wrong assumptions are discussed supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text.  
60 Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity, supra note 29, at 18; cf. RESTORING CONFIDENCE, supra 
note 49, at 7 (recommending the improvement of independent valuation procedures).  This may include 
procedures for the valuation of securitized products that will not have active markets. 
61 Cf. supra note 51 (discussing the overreliance on faulty risk models by investors). 
62 Cf. Larry Light, Bondholder Beware: Value Subject To Change Without Notice, BUS. WK., 
Mar. 29, 1993, at 34, available at LEXIS, News Library, BUSWK File (discussing that within years 
after the Marriott “split,” investors favor higher interest rates over “event-risk” covenants, once the 
examples of events justifying the covenants have receded in memory). 
63 See Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 146 (discussing the cost-efficiency of securitization); supra note 
2 and accompanying text (discussing the efficiency of securitization); see also Gorton, supra note 19, at 
75 (concluding that “[s]ecuritization is an efficient, incentive-compatible, response to bankruptcy costs 
and capital requirements”); Ethan Penner, The Future of Securitization, WALL ST. J., July 10, 2008, at 
A15, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File (observing that “[s]ecuritization will continue to 
play an important role—if adapted appropriately”). 
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[t]here are no such issues [as occurred in the subprime crisis] 
with securitization generally, or with the use of off-balance 
sheet vehicles for the securitization of those [other] asset 
classes.  Other securitizations are not so sensitive to the 
prices of the underlying assets and so they are not so 
susceptible to bubbles.64 
Nonetheless, in the near future at least, it is likely that securitization 
transactions will need to refocus on basic structures and asset types in 
order to attract investors.65  In particular, there will likely be an emphasis 
on cash-flow securitizations in which there are the traditional “two-ways 
out.”66  Furthermore, we are not likely to see many highly complex 
securitization products, like CDO and ABS CDO transactions, which 
magnify leverage.67  
In the medium term, securitization’s future will be at least marginally 
influenced by the extent to which the intrinsic values of mortgage-backed 
securities turn out to be worth more than their market values.  I have 
argued that, as a result of irrational panic, the market prices of mortgage-
backed securities collapsed substantially below the intrinsic value of the 
mortgage loans underlying those securities.68  A large differential would 
indicate that the problem was more investor panic than intrinsic lack of 
worth. 
Whether securitization will remain vibrant and inventive in the long 
term, however, will turn on our ability to better understand the problems of 
complexity, which was at the root of many of the failures that gave rise to 
the subprime crisis.69  
                                                                                                                          
64 Gorton, supra note 19, at 67. 
65 See generally Douglas Gale, Standard Securities, 59 REV. ECON. STUD. 731 (1992) (arguing 
that the cost of becoming informed about unfamiliar securities may lead to gains from standardizing 
securities); Andrew Davidson, Reinventing Securitization: If It Ain’t Broke, Don’t Fix It.  But What if It 
is Broken?, THE PIPELINE, Feb. 2008, http://www.ad-co.com/newsletter/2008/Feb08/Credit.htm 
(advocating simpler securitization structures). 
66 In contrast, subprime mortgage securitizations had only one way out: home appreciation.  See 
Schwarcz, supra notes 10–11 and accompanying text (discussing how home appreciation allowed 
mortgagors to refinance to lower mortgage rates).  Similarly, we are unlikely to see many securitization 
transactions with balance sheet motivations.  Cf. KRAVITT, supra note 2, at 14–15 (observing that 
“when securitization becomes an end in itself as opposed to a needed source of financing, certainly 
there is at least the potential for abuse”). 
67 Cf. Schwarcz, supra note 10; supra text accompanying notes 61–62.  For a more detailed 
prediction of how practices will improve in the securitization industry, see KRAVITT, supra note 2, at 
23–25. 
68 Schwarcz, supra note 10, at 23 n.75 (estimating the intrinsic value by examining the mortgage 
loans underlying the securities and ascertaining which were subprime, which were prime, and which 
were delinquent or in default). 
69 See supra notes 6–7, 44–46, 51, 57–58 and accompanying text (indicating where problems of 
complexity contributed to the subprime crisis); cf. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity, supra note 29, at 
2–4 (examining how the complexities of modern financial markets and investment securities can trigger 
market failures). 
